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Abstract 
I have argued elsewhere (Navarro-Reyes 2010) that the kind of excuses that appeal to a lack of 
intention in the performance of a speech act do not, in general, try to deny that the deed itself took 
place (i.e., in cases where we say that the act is performed unintentionally, we would not imply 
that the act was not performed at all, but that it was performed in a particular way). If this is cor-
rect, speech acts token performances ought to be defined independently of the speaker’s putative 
illocutionary intentions. In this paper I will pursue this idea by discussing the views of Alston 
(2000), a prominent champion of the intentionalistic account, who defines speech acts in terms of 
the notion of “taking responsibility”. Unlike Alston, I will claim that ‘unheard speech acts’ are not 
a legitimate category within speech acts, whereas cases of ‘unintended speech acts’ might be cor-
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Introduction 
Should speech acts be defined as intentional actions, i.e. as actions essentially per-
formed with particular intentions? That seems to be out of question in speech acts 
theory, at least in Austin’s (1962) and Searle’s (1969) tradition. I do not hesitate 
that speech acts, as a social practice, must be defined in terms of intentions and, in 
particular, of illocutionary intentions. With no appeal to those intentions there is no 
way to understand what the practice is, and no way to distinguish different types of 
illocutionary acts. But I would like to cast some doubts here about the need to de-
fine token speech acts performances in terms of the putative intentions of speakers. 
In my opinion, it could be legitimate to assert that someone performed a particular 
speech act, even if in fact she did not have the illocutionary intentions that are usu-
ally considered as constitutive of that speech act.  
My criticism will focus on Alston’s (2000) treatment of two sorts of boundary 
cases in speech acts theory: unheard speech acts and unintended speech acts. With 
respect to the former, Alston considers that they are a legitimate category within 
speech acts. In his opinion, an illocutionary act does take place despite being un-
heard by anybody. For instance, according to Alston, an utterance that was per-
formed with the intention to make a promise would still be a promise, despite it 
was not heard by the intended audience, or even by anybody. I will explain the rea-
sons why I think this is wrong, since it implies that Alston’s view is too focussed 
on what has been called ‘inner’ conditions. 
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With respect to the latter, unintended speech acts, Alston’s position is the re-
verse: he tends to assume that, in so far as the utterance was not performed by the 
speaker with some specific illocutionary intention, the alleged speech act did not 
take place at all. In his view, the unintended speech act would only be an apparent 
speech act: something wrongly considered as a speech act by the audience, but that, 
in so far as it was unintended, would not have taken place at all. I will also disagree 
with Alston on this point, and I will defend that unintended speech acts are a legit-
imate category of speech acts: a crucial possibility that must be considered in the 
definition of token—or individual—illocutionary acts. The truth is that Alston’s 
position in this respect is not very clear: in the first place, he doubts that unintended 
speech acts are even possible at all. In his view, illocutionary acts are essentially 
intentional actions. However, in case unintended speech acts were ever possible, 
Alston considers them as so fringe and marginal possibilities that he does not find 
them relevant enough to modify the core of his theory. Intention, for Alston —as 
for most speech acts theorists—, is constitutive of each and every illocutionary act 
performance. In contrast to this, I will defend that intentions are constitutive of the 
practice of speech acts, but not necessarily of each and every performance within 
that practice. We need to introduce intentions into our account if we want to define 
illocutionary acts types, but we should not introduce them as necessary conditions 
to identify illocutionary act tokens. In other words: intentions do not have to be 
necessarily part of the scene, in order to have a case of fully committing illocution-
ary act performance.  
The point of view that I will defend, as we shall see in the end, denies that the 
first person point of view should have the last word in determining the occurrence 
of speech acts. On the contrary, I will defend that it is the second person point of 
view—i.e., the point of view of the hearer—that should have that last word, despite 
it is—and must be—epistemically limited. From the hearer’s limited perspective, 
she might have the right to assert that a particular illocutionary act took place dis-
regarding the effective occurrence of intentions by the part of the speaker. The key 
to guess if a particular speech act did effectively take place is not to be found in the 
speaker’s mind, but in the legitimate expectations that the utterance created in the 
hearer’s mind. These expectations are linked to the attribution of intentions to the 
speaker but, in the last resort, what makes the utterance count as a speech act is not 
the effective occurrence of those intentions, but the legitimacy of the hearer’s at-
tribution of those intentions.  
In order to show the relevance of this discussion, I will briefly sketch the rise 
of the problem in Austin’s and Searle’s accounts, before getting to Alston. 
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Approaching the problem 
Austin’s Hippolytus and the risks of the first person perspective 
I think we have to thank Gazdar (1981: 68) for the one that might be the simplest 
and clearest formalization of what a speech act is: “a function from contexts into 
contexts”. By uttering some words, the speaker changes the social context and, in 
particular, she changes its normative conditions. E.g.: at t1, before I made my 
daughter the promise to bring her to the park, I was not obliged to bring her to the 
park. At t2 I utter the words “I promise to bring you to the park”, which she hears 
and understands. Because of that, at t3, I am obliged to bring her to the park. Why 
did the normative situation change between t1 and t3? Why do we say that I have a 
normative reason to do something at t3, which I did not have at t1? Gazdar’s defini-
tion is a good description of what happened, but it is not an explanation. The ques-
tion is: why does the context change at all, just because I uttered some words? 
Austin was clearly right when he claimed that making a speech act is some-
thing more than just uttering some words. Disagreement arrives when we try to de-
fine what this ‘something more’ is: i.e. the kind of conditions that turn the mere 
utterance of some words into fully fledged—and morally committing—speech acts. 
It seems to be out of question that there must be some kind of external conditions 
about the surrounding context of the utterance: words ought to be uttered in a cer-
tain way, in front of a pertinent audience, maybe according to some pre-established 
conventions, or at least some shared linguistic knowledge.
1
 Furthermore, most 
scholars agree on the need to include some sort of internal or cognitive require-
ments, such as that the act had been done with specific illocutionary intentions—
the intention to promise, to threat, or to make a statement—, or that the speaker was 
aware of at least some of the consequences of her own words. It seems that the ut-
terance must have been done voluntarily, consciously, and intentionally, or on pur-
pose, and it is usually alleged in favour of this that the lack of those internal condi-
tions gives rise to different kinds of excuses, which could finally not make it sensi-
ble to require from the speaker to be committed to her words. E.g., by claiming that 
it was not my intention to promise, I would try to show that I am not committed to 
my own words —i.e. I would try to show that my words did not effectively change 
the normative situation. From this point of view, unintentional promises would not 
be real promises, but just some sort of misleading situation: something that looked 
like a promise, so to speak, from the outside. Promises made without the intention 
                                                          
1  I will mostly use the concept of “context” as referring to a set of external and internal condi-
tions of the utterance, not in Sperber & Wilson’s limited sense, as “a psychological construct, 
a subset of the hearer’s assumptions about the world” (1986: 15). The way I will use the 
term—which coincides, I think, with Harnish’s recent discussion on the conditions of speech 
acts (2009: 10)—will be wider, since it does not only include those assumptions, but also 
many other features.  
190 Jesús Navarro-Reyes  
to promise would not be a kind of promise; in fact they would not be promises at 
all. 
However, Austin was quite reticent to introduce internal conditions in his ac-
count because he considered that this would show speech acts as a sort of inner per-
formances that would only indirectly take place in the public scene. If we accepted 
that there are some sort of internal or mental necessary conditions for the perfor-
mance of a speech act, we would seem to buy too that there is something in the 
mind of the speaker, hidden to the hearer, which precludes us from certainly know 
weather the speech act did effectively take place or not. In Austin’s views, speech 
acts are social acts: they take place in the social environment. The problem is that, 
if their performance depends constitutively on the existence of inner hidden mental 
states, which are only accessible to the speaker herself, then we seem to loose that 
social character. Speech acts would run the risk to become something the speaker 
makes inside his mind, where the external manifestations would only be contingent 
and accessory symptoms of that ‘spiritual’ private action.  
Austin’s fears are personalised in the character of Hippolytus, who denied to be 
bounded to his words because they had allegedly not been uttered with the intention 
to perform a committing speech act. We find Hippolytus at t3, after the occurrence 
of an utterance that the audience had considered as a promise, claiming that that 
utterance had not been made with the intention to bind: “An oath my mouth made, 
but not my heart”. If this escape were possible at all, then the whole system of 
speech acts would melt away like snow under the sun. If words could not bind un-
less they were accompanied by inner commitments, and inner commitments are 
never present in the public scene, then they loose the important role that they have 
in the working of social, stable systems of collaborative actions. It is thus a crucial 
task for speech acts theory to give an account that would prevent bad faith users of 
language from escaping their duties. This is not just a matter of fringe or marginal 
cases, but probably the more fundamental mission that speech acts theory could 
ever have. 
On the other side, Austin is aware that intentions must somehow be part of the 
story: if promises were never done with the intention to be committed to words, the 
practice of promising would loose its point. It seems that I made a promise because 
I intended to be bound by my words—i.e., I intended to change the normative con-
text, in order to grant the hearer a certain right over my future actions. By the same 
token, whenever I order something, I intend the hearer to be forced to do what I 
say. Whenever I apologise for something, I intend to show my regret about what I 
did. What could be the point of speech acts, if they did not express those illocution-
ary intentions? 
So we seem to be divided between two incompatible requirements, and both of 
them seem to be quite sensible: on the one hand, we have to define illocutionary 
acts through external conditions, since they would otherwise be detached from the 
social environment where public duties are established. If those external conditions 
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were not fully determinant, we would be blind when trying to ascribe duties and 
commitments to others, and that would always leave an open door to Hippolytus 
and those of his kind. On the other hand, we need to define illocutionary acts 
through internal conditions, since their very performance seems to be non contin-
gently linked to the effective intervention of our mental states. If those mental 
states were not involved, speech acts would seem to be empty. Speech acts without 
real intentions do not even seem to be speech acts, but just something that resem-
bles them ‘from the outside’. If some necessary conditions were purely internal, we 
would be blind in the adscription of illocutionary acts to others; if all necessary 





Searle and his disdain for merely epistemological problems 
Dealing with this tension is a must for speech acts theoreticians. In general, they try 
to sort it out by combining internal and external conditions in their accounts. 
Searle’s (1969) classic theory might be the best example. He defines what a prom-
ise is describing both what happens on the inside and on the outside of the minds of 
the speakers. In his view, speech acts must be performed with particular intentions, 
which are constitutive of what those acts are—i.e., those acts would not be what 
they are if those intentions were not in their origin. And, at the same time, it is the 
external character of the utterance what makes it count as a speech act in the con-
text where it takes place. This is possible because speech acts are governed by what 
Searle calls “constitutive rules”, which always have the structure: x counts as y in C 
—i.e., an utterance of a certain kind counts as the performance of a particular illo-
cutionary act in its context.
3
 If the speaker is aware of this constitutive rule, and her 
                                                          
2  Although this tension is important in Austin’s work, his famous doctrine of the infelicities 
does not confront it at all (1962: 14). The situations that he considers as fringe or marginal 
are always cases where the speaker performs the utterance with the intention to make the 
speech act, but some conditions are not met up to the point that the act was purported but 
void (misfires) or professed but hollow (abuses). But what would Austin have to say about 
cases in which a speaker did not intend to perform a speech act, but her audience was well 
justified to consider that she had performed it? Would that be a kind of ‘infelicity’? If that in-
ternal condition was not met, did the very act ever happen at all? What would be, according 
to Austin, the status of unintended speech acts? 
3  The way this account relies on pre-established conventions has been criticised in some fa-
mous occasions—such as in (Strawson 1964) or (Sperber & Wilson 1986: 244). Those ac-
counts rely on inferential processes to do without conventions—beyond basic linguistic ones. 
But I do not believe that this makes any essential difference with respect to the point that I 
would like to make. In any case, even if constitutive rules depended on inferential processes, 
it would still seem that those processes would somehow have to be externally justified. In 
other words: the inferential basis must be publicly accessible, since it is what makes it legi-
timate for a hearer to take x as counting as y in C. 
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action is intentional and effective, she intends to make x count as y in C. Both in-
ternal and external conditions are met there, in ideal conditions.  
The question we could address to Searle would then be: what happens when 
only one of those two sorts of conditions is met? In particular, what happens when 
x does count as y in C, but x was not performed with that intention? Would we still 
have here a case of an illocutionary act or not? E.g.: would an unintended promise 
be a sort of promise—involuntary made, but still fully committing—, or would it 
not be a promise at all?
4
 And, alternatively, we would also have to ask what hap-
pens in cases where the intention is not fulfilled through the performance: cases in 
which the speaker intends x to count as y in C, but she is, for instance, unheard by 
the intended audience.  
Searle would probably claim that those are merely epistemological questions. 
We know that both internal and external conditions are met in ‘normal’ speech acts. 
And the core of his theory is about those normal conditions. Extraordinary situa-
tions should not affect the core of the theory, since we all know what an ordinary 
promise is, and it is this intuition what is developed through the systematic study of 
‘linguistic characterizations’ (1969: 4). In real life, we might don’t know, in partic-
ular cases, if some of those conditions are met: maybe x does count as y in C, alt-
hough the speaker did not intend it to be so. But from the fact that we might not be 
sure it in particular cases, according to Searle, nothing interesting follows about the 
nature of the practice, which necessarily involves both aspects. In his opinion, 
speech acts theory should be made from the point of view of God, where all the 
aspects of the context would be transparently present, including the minds of the 
speakers.  
However, I would like to discuss the convenience of those claims. The truth is 
that, in real life, speech acts should hold up even in God’s absence, or at least in 
God’s silence: what shall we then say from our point of view, which is—and will 
always be—epistemically limited? In particular, it could be alleged that, from the 
point of view of human speakers, the internal cognitive states of others are never 
part of the shared context. At least that is what Hippolytus seems to claim: that we 
only saw his words, uttered by his tongue, but not his heart or his soul, which had 
quite different intentions. In cases like this, we have two inconsistent candidates to 
determine the effective occurrence of the act: the alleged intentions of the speaker 
on the one hand and the external constitutive rules on the other. We find both that x 
counts as y in C, and that the speaker claims that he did not intend x to count as y in 
                                                          
4  It might be important to point out that I am not referring here to cases of insincere speech 
acts—such as insincere promises, where the promisor would not have the intention to fulfill 
the promise. Even in cases like this, as Searle’s discussion correctly shows (1969: 62), it 
seems that the speaker should somehow have the intention that her utterance will make her 
responsible for intending to perform the promised action. It is the lack of this second order 
intention what bad faith users of language, such as Hippolytus, could always deny to have 
had.  
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C. In cases like this, Searle’s theory eludes the problem, considering it as merely 
epistemological. But it could hardly be ignored, unless we are happy to leave our 
theory out of the realm of real life. 
 
Alston and the act of taking responsibility 
In contrast to Searle, who seems to avoid the problem, William P. Alston (2000) 
has tried to give it an answer. In his view, an illocutionary act is necessarily the ef-
fect of an intended action. This intended action is what he calls “R’ing”, which 
stands for “taking responsibility for the satisfaction of a condition” (2000: 54). Ac-
cording to Alston, R’ing is something that the speaker does: not just something she 
realises or assumes, or something that happens to her, but an action that must be 
conscious and intentional, in order to be the sort of action that it is.
5
 The active 
character of this intentional action involves the utterer’s instituting a state of affairs, 
rather than just being a matter of the utterer's recognizing an already existing state 
of affairs, or assuming it. 
That would mean that, if a speaker (S) promised a hearer (H) that he would 
bring her to the park, then S took responsibility (R’d) for bringing H to the park. 
And if S was not taking responsibility for bringing H to the park, S did not promise 
H to bring her to the park. Whatever he uttered, without the intention to take that 
responsibility there would be no illocutionary act. This intention would be constitu-
tive of the act up to the point that, in its absence, there would be no such act. Prom-
ising would not just be uttering some words, but R’ing in uttering them. The speak-
er’s intentional action of R’ing would be the reason why Gazdar’s function applies, 
and normative contexts change with the occurrence of speech performances. 
According to Alston, we rely on the external conditions in order to recognise 
those internal intentions. If x counts as y in C, it is because we know that, by utter-
ing x, S was R’ing. Looking for the speaker’s intention to R is looking for the very 
occurrence of the illocutionary act. Providing conclusive evidence that S did not 
intend to R would eo ipso mean that S did not perform any illocutionary act at all.  
This is the view that I would like to confront. In what follows, I will try to 
show that this account does not work because what makes a community consider an 
utterance as a committing speech act is not the presence or absence of that act of 
R’ing by the part of the speaker in the moment of the utterance, but the way the 
utterance itself was performed with regards to the set of expectations that were just-
ly generated by it in the audience. In my view, it is the uptake of hearers—at least 
the one that is legitimate, according to the circumstances—what would be constitu-
                                                          
5  Moya (1990: 38-48) seems to defend a similar point from the philosophy of action. He does 
not talk about speech or illocutionary acts, but about “symbolic acts”, which he defines as 
necessarily implying the intention from the part of the agent. I believe that most of what is 
said here about Alston might also be applied, mutatis mutandi, to Moya’s account of symbol-
ic acts. 
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tive of the act itself. If I am right, the act would still be in order even if we didn’t 
know if the speaker had the intention to R. What is more: the illocutionary act 
would still be such an act even if we finally knew that the speaker was not intend-
ing to R. Recognising the intention to R would then not be the same as identifying 
the effective occurrence of the illocutionary act. 
I think that Alston is right in considering responsibility as the key concept in 
the definition of illocutionary acts, but I don’t think that the speaker’s take of re-
sponsibility is the crucial point. I would say that the key is not in the assumption of 
responsibility from the first person point of view —i.e. the point of view of the 
speaker— but the attribution of responsibility from the second person point of view 
—i.e. the point of view of the hearer. The necessary conditions for the identifica-
tion of a speech act are not to be found in the first person point of view of the 
speaker, who allegedly made herself responsible for her words, but from the second 
person point of view of the hearer, who legitimately made the speaker responsible 
for her utterance. I will thus try to defend that token speech acts do not hold up be-
cause we make ourselves responsible for what we say when we say it, but because 
we are made responsible for what we have said, once we have said it.  
 
Confronting the problem in Alston’s account  
It might be easier to understand the difference between Alston’s views and the ones 
that I am proposing by considering how could we paraphrase the following ques-
tion: did the speech act take place? According to Alston, we could replace this by 
the question: did the speaker R? In my view, the correct paraphrase would be: was 
the hearer sufficiently justified to attribute the intention to R to the speaker? The 
difference is important because the hearer could be justified, but wrong. I.e. he 
could have very good reasons to attribute to the speaker an illocutionary intention, 
even if the speaker did not have it at all.
6
 If that is correct, we could find situations 
in which the speech act took place, despite the absence of illocutionary intention by 
the part of the speaker. Those would be cases of unintended speech acts, and I will 
try to show that they are genuine attributions of speech acts. Alternatively, even if 
the speaker R’d intentionally, in my view the speech act did not take place if the 
hearer did not have —or was not aware— of good reasons to attribute to the speak-
er the intention to R. Those would be cases of unheard speech acts, and I will claim 
that they are not genuine attributions of speech acts. The difference between Al-
ston’s views and the ones that I propose can thus be tested in these two sorts of 
marginal, fringe cases.  
  
                                                          
6  I am assuming here a point that is generally accepted in epistemology: that somebody could 
be justified in believing p, even if she could be wrong. “S is justified to believe p” does not 
imply that p is necessarily true. 
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Are there unheard illocutionary acts? 
In contrast to both Austin and Searle, Alston considers that the illocutionary act 
does take place disregarding the audience uptake, understanding, or even hearing of 
the utterance. This is his reason to refuse Searle’s requirement of “normal condi-
tions of input and output” in the performance of promises. According to Alston, 
e.g.: 
it is not necessary for promising [a hearer] H that I will do [an action] A […] that H un-
derstand what I said. To be sure, if H did not understand me, she didn't realize that I 
made that promise, but I could still have done it. Suppose that I mistakenly think that H 
heard and understood me. I show up to take H to the meeting, and H is surprised at this. 
I might well say “Didn’t you hear me when I promised to take you?”, thereby presup-
posing that I did promise this even if H didn't realize it (Alston 2000: 53). 
Therefore, according to Alston, an unheard promise is a promise, as far as the act of 
R’ing took place, unbeknownst to the hearer. Alston is aware that this is a thorny 
point, since it could seem that he is turning the speech act into something that takes 
place in absence of any social frame. He thus has to qualify later his position, along 
the following terms: 
the possibility of a normative state of affairs being initiated by [the utterer’s] U’s R’ing 
that C depends on the existence of a system of rules that is in force within a community 
that includes U. […] When U R's that C in performing an illocutionary act, that is not a 
purely private performance that could be what it is regardless of how it engages the sur-
rounding community. For R'ing consists in making certain kinds of reactions by others 
appropriate (Alston 2000: 58). 
However, as I will try to show, this clarification does not seem to be enough to ex-
onerate Alston from the accusation of considering speech acts as private perfor-
mances, which only accidentally take place in the social scene.  
But let’s follow his argument for a moment. We are dealing with a situation in 
which S believes that he made a promise to H, but H did not hear it. S believes that 
a promise was made, but H does not. Who would be wrong there? According to 
Alston, it is H who is mistaken, since S did take the responsibility for her words, 
whether H heard them or not, and whether H recognised her intentions or not. In 
Alston’s opinion, the promise was performed, despite the fact that nobody noticed 
it, because S would have succeeded in making certain kinds of reactions appropri-
ate—disregarding the fact that those who could have benefited from this normative 
change knew it or not. If S had not shown up to take H to the meeting, then H 
would have been in a good situation to recriminate this to S, whether she knew or 
not that she was in such a position. And S would still be exposed to such criticism, 
according to Alston, because she did perform her speech act, although it was not 
heard by anybody. 
Pace Alston, I would say that it is S who would be wrong in this imagined 
case. Not the unhearing promisee, but the unheard promisor. In my view, the prom-
ise would have not taken place, since it was unheard by anybody. In my opinion, 
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the correct way to describe the situation is to say that S intended to make a promise, 
but failed to do so. The reason is that, by describing the situation this way, we pre-
serve the difference between an intended but defective act, and an effectively per-
formed one. Imagine S fails to accomplish what she thought she had taken the re-
sponsibility to do—i.e., she fails to perform the promised act. Full with regret, she 
cannot take out of her head the idea that she has let H down. But then, in a further 
conversation, she realises that H did not hear the promise. In that case, S could feel 
relief quite happily: she was lucky at the end, since although she tried to put herself 
under the responsibility to do C, she failed to do so, without noticing it. She could 
correctly recriminate herself for not doing what she thought was her duty (and she 
certainly should think about it twice before making any other promise), but this re-
gret would not be the result of the actual breach of any social obligation, because 
such an obligation would not exist. In Gazdar’s jargon, there would have been no 
change in the normative context because of S’s utterance. 
In cases of unheard illocutionary acts, we have two conflicting sets of beliefs: S 
believes that she has made a promise, whereas H believes that no promise took 
place. Both cannot be right at the same time. Alston would claim that it is S who is 
right, because he R’d—and this would be a relevant fact, unknown by H. I would 
agree that S R’d but, in my opinion, it is S how lacks a relevant piece of 
knowledge—that her utterance was not heard by H. So both of them are in epistem-
ically limited situations: both of them lack some significant piece of knowledge. 
This is the reason why the problem is epistemological, and it does not show up 
from Searle’s perspective, since he intends to describe the situation from God’s 
point of view. But my intention is to face the problem from the epistemically lim-
ited situations of the contenders, in order to determine if the normative context did 
change or not—i.e. if Gazdar’s function applies or not. And my opinion is that it 
does not apply, since the speaker’s obligation is not effective—although, for a cer-
tain period of time, he believes it is. And, with no change in the normative context, 
no function would apply, and no illocutionary act would take place. An unheard 
illocutionary act would not be a kind of illocutionary act, but a failed one, a fake 
one: something that merely resembles an illocutionary act, so to speak, ‘from the 
inside’—i.e. from the point of view of the speaker. Why giving the priority to the 
hearer’s point of view? I would like to return to this question at the end of the pa-
per. 
 
Unintentional illocutionary acts 
According to Alston, in performing an illocutionary act, S would not only R that p 
is the case, but also intend her act to count for H as such an intentional action. The 
crucial point of R’ing is both that it is intentional, and that its performance has the 
intention to be recognised as intentional —following in this the tradition of Grice. 
Alston is thus very reluctant to accept that an unintentional illocutionary act could 
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be ever conceivable. After considering some examples, he finally does accept that 
possibility, but he expresses his doubts that those are cases of a fully fledged 
speech acts; and, most importantly, he restricts the conditions of his examples in 
such a strong way that they become really eccentric cases, which would not force 
him to reformulate his theory in order to accommodate them. I will try to show in 
detail that his way of twisting the examples is somehow confusing and biased.  
Alston considers three couples of examples of actions that seem to be candi-
dates for a legitimate category of unintentional illocutionary acts: firstly, cases of 
slips of the tongue and linguistic ignorance; secondly, cases where the hearer did 
not grasp the deviant intentions of the speaker, although he legitimately expected 
those deviant intentions to be grasped; and thirdly, cases where the speaker did not 
give any clue of any kind of his own deviant intentions. I will confront those three 
kinds of examples in turn. 
 
Slips of the tongue and linguistic ignorance 
In the first group of examples, the speaker produces her sentence voluntarily in or-
der to perform a certain illocutionary act, but the utterance is inadequate for this 
intention. Although S intended x to count as y in C, x does not count as y in C at 
all, but as z. From the hearer’s point of view, it seems that S did z; but S did not 
have that intention—i.e., her action could not be described as intentional under that 
description. In cases like this, Alston claims, we would be wrong in claiming that S 
did z, because z is described as an intentional action—i.e. as an illocutionary act, 
whose illocutionary intentions are constitutive—, and as far as S did not have the 
intention to do z, she did not do it.  
However, in my view, slips of the tongue, for instance, are clearly cases in 
which the speaker does say whatever she said, and do whatever she did, although 
she allegedly did it unintentionally. E.g., if her words were outrageous or inappro-
priate, the hearer would have the right to recriminate her for them. Just like you 
would not step less strongly on someone else’s foot just because you did it uninten-
tionally, you would not perform a less committing speech act just because you 
thought that you were doing something else, or because you did not realise exactly 
what you were doing. The unintended character of the act does not make the act 
vanish away: it only allows us to qualify it in a particular way, making a certain 
sort of excuses valid: instead of excusing herself by saying, e.g., that her unjustified 
utterance was the result of a state of nervousness or anger, in cases of slips of the 
tongue S would do so by claiming that the speech act that took place was not the 
one she was intending to produce. In any case, the act was performed, and if it was 
inappropriate, it would require an excuse, precisely because it did happen. In this 
sense, there is an important difference between claiming that whatever the hearer 
understood, that was not what the speaker said, and claiming that what the speaker 
actually said was not what she was intending to say. Claiming that she did not in-
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tend to say it is completely different from claiming that she did not say it at all—
see. 
On the other side, a lack of linguistic knowledge by the part of the speaker 
would not prevent the utterance from having illocutionary and perlocutionary ef-
fects. The problem here is that Alston’s examples are carefully selected in order to 
present cases where the resulting act would be impossible, or absurd: 
A friend who had spent a sabbatical in Florence reported going into a grocery and ask-
ing for a dozen “oggi” (todays), intending to have been asking for a dozen eggs (“uovi”) 
(Alston 2000: 137).  
Of course, in that case we could hardly say that a fully committing speech act ever 
took place; however, the reason is not that the speaker did not intend to order a 
dozen “todays”, but that ordering a dozen “todays” is a meaningless action—and 
even a grammatical mistake. It is not the lack of intention what prevents the act 
from being fulfilled, but the request's grammatical incoherence.  
Let me thus propose my own example: imagine I order a full English breakfast 
in a restaurant believing that I am ordering a continental breakfast, just because 
somebody told me that a “full English breakfast” is usually composed by a crois-
sant, a juice, and a coffee; when the waiter brings me a plate with eggs, sausages, 
beacon, baked beans, tomatoes, mushrooms and toasts, I am astonished, and I deny 
that that was what I had ordered. However, it is me who is completely wrong, not 
the waiter, since that was in fact what I had ordered. Only if the owner is kind 
enough to exonerate me from the consequences of my speech act, will I be exempt-
ed to pay what I in fact ordered. And this is so because it is not my intention what 
makes the utterance count as an illocutionary act: what makes my utterance be an 
case of the constitutive rule is not my intention, but the performance itself.  
This first group of examples of unintended acts proves a very simple point: the 
performance of the act is defined by what I uttered, not by my intention in uttering 
it. If I could somehow prove that I did not have that intention, and convince the 
hearer that it was a slip of tongue, or a linguistic confusion, I would still rely on her 
benevolence to accept my excuses. It is a matter of good manners to do so, but in 
the last resort, the hearer might have good reasons not to accept my excuses—all 
the stuff that is included in a full English might cost a fortune!—, and she would 
have a right to do so, since it is me who would be in debt because of my words. 
What makes Gazdar’s function work in any particular occasion is not the specific 
intentions of the speaker in that occasion, but the way the utterance itself is per-
formed —intentionally or not— according to some constitutive rule. 
 
Non-grasped deviant intentions 
But of course, the kind of illocutionary act S performed is not just determined by 
the meaning of the words—or their illocutionary act potential, in Alston’s jargon: 
we must also take into account the context of the utterance. And that is what, ac-
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cording to Alston, makes the difference in the second group of cases. Giving the 
example of a guy who tests a microphone by uttering “I am going to become a 
hermit”, Alston claims that the speaker is not committed to the act he announces, 
just because somebody in the audience did not realise that he was just testing the 
microphone. Would this be a case of an ‘unintended avowal’? The answer is no, in 
Alston’s opinion, since the intentions of the speaker that are constitutive of the 
avowal—his intention to R, and to make his own utterance count as such intention 
for others—would be absent from the scene.  
Now again, the absurdity of Alston’s example predisposes us to deny that the 
unintended act ever took place. It is plain that the speaker would not be committed 
to become a hermit, but not because he did not have the intention to be bound by 
his words, but because committing oneself to become a hermit is quite a weird 
thing to do in a concert, just like that, in front of thousands of strangers, coming out 
of the blue. But imagine that the sound technician had uttered the words: “Ladies 
and gentlemen, I’m afraid that the concert has been cancelled. You will be refunded 
the cost of the tickets on the way out”. Well, in that case, the guy would have prob-
ably lost his job! However, if words were just being mentioned by him, but not 
used, and the utterance itself would thus be deprived of intentionality, why should 
it matter at all what he said? Both the “I am going to become a hermit” utterance 
and the “the concert has been cancelled” one allegedly lack any communicative 
intention whatsoever, since both were just uttered to test the sound system. The dif-
ference is not in the intention of the speaker, which could be exactly the same, but 
in the kind of response that would be legitimately expected. The speaker himself 
would probably expect that uptake, but he does not have to expect it in order to 
make it legitimate: the legitimacy would be determinate by the utterance and its 
context, independently of the speaker’s awareness of this legitimacy, and even of 
the speaker’s illocutionary intentions. The sound technician would give a poor ex-
cuse if he said that he expected everybody to be aware that he was just testing the 
microphone: he did in fact announce that the concert was cancelled—he might have 
done it unintentionally, if he’s sincere and clumsy enough, but he did it anyway.  
Alston tries to show that the speech act does not ever take place, unless it is ac-
companied by the speaker’s illocutionary intention to R. But in his example the 
reason why the audience is not legitimated to attribute the speech act to the speaker 
is not that the speaker did not have the intention to R, but that the resulting utter-
ance, in that context, would not be enough to legitimate the audience to attribute 
the illocutionary intention to the speaker. If the content of the utterance were cor-
rect and appropriate in the hearer’s context, that legitimacy would not depend on 
the effective existence of the intention by the part of the hearer.  
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Non-communicated deviant intentions 
We finally face the third group of examples: cases in which the speaker means 
something completely different from what her words mean, but does not give any 
clue whatsoever of this being so. Alston’s strategy of turning the examples into ec-
centric situations that could not be taken seriously is here clearer than ever before. I 
will focus on his example of a groom who says, “Yes I do”, intending to mean “It’s 
hot in here”. In Alston’s example, the groom would later claim that he was using a 
private code, although nobody was aware of that. Alston specifies here that: 
We must be clear that [the example] does not involve the following features: (1) The 
groom cracks under the strain and temporarily loses contact with his surroundings, 
thereby failing to realize that he was participating in a marriage ceremony [...]. If that 
were the case, he was performing no illocutionary act at all, intentional or unintentional 
(Alston, 2000: 140). 
Well, this is quite disputable. To begin with, most of the things the groom could do 
during his alleged trance would probably be considered as unintentional actions, 
and it would hardly make sense to say that they were not actions at all, but merely 
events. V.g., if he began to tell an inappropriate joke to the bride’s father, we would 
probably agree that he did not do it intentionally, or even consciously, but it is ob-
vious that he did do it, although unconsciously—unless we want to assume that he 
did not do anything at all, but just his body, or his mouth, or that the joke that was 
told was not told by anybody, which would be quite a weird way to describe what 
happened. What would then prevent us from saying that he did perform an uninten-
tional illocutionary act if, instead of telling the joke, he had answered: “I do”? De-
pending on the behaviour the groom shows during his alleged trance, we would be 
inclined to say that his illocutionary action was intentional or unintentional, con-
scious or unconscious, but in any case we could not deny that he did perform the 
act. If he seemed dazzled and confused, and mechanically uttered the words “I do” 
while he was staring at the infinite, we would probably assume that his actions 
were being performed unintentionally, and we would be quite prone to excuse him 
if he claimed that he was not aware of what he was doing. But if he seemed awake 
an relaxed, he looked at his surroundings in a confident way, smiled at the bride 
sympathetically, and pronounced the words with clear and precise diction, hardly 
would we excuse him later if he claimed having done it all in a trance, uncon-
sciously, proposing this as an excuse to cancel the effects of the wedding. I.e., what 
makes the illocutionary act a valid act is not the presence or absence of the inten-
tion of the agent, only known by himself and merely hypothesised by his hearers, 
but the way in which the act is performed in the social context, and the way it gen-
erates a legitimate uptake by its audience. Any alleged intention will have to rely 
on context features that are somehow observable by others, and could not only rely 
on a hidden state by the part of the speaker. 
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But Alston denies this point categorically when he goes on shaping the exam-
ple to his liking, turning it into something still harder to believe, since his case does 
not either involve the following feature: 
(2) The groom mistakenly supposes himself to have called "time out", to have suspend-
ed the proceedings so that he could practice saying the fatal words, roll them over on his 
tongue, get the feel of them, before he actually did the deed. In that case we would all 
agree that he had not yet undertaken the marriage contract. If he had supposed himself 
to have called time out but had not gotten this across to the other participants, then the 
fact that he had made a stupid but honest mistake would shield him from any imputation 
of undertaking the marriage (Alston 2000: 140). 
Once again, this would depend on the course of events: if immediately after utter-
ing the words “Yes I do” the groom said “But no, no: do not misunderstand me, I 
was just rehearsing”, we would probably be more prone to accept that he did make 
a very stupid mistake. But if he did not say anything else, and continued with the 
wedding, he could hardly adduce later that he was just rolling the words over in his 
tongue, as Alston claims. He did get married, and his words were the deed. It might 
have been true that he did not intend to get married while uttering his words, but he 
did get married anyway.  
Now, Alston makes two claims about this final example that will help me point 
out the exact aspect of his theory that I don’t find correct: 
(1) We must not confuse the question of whether the groom purported to marry the 
bride, whatever his intentions, with the question of what illocutionary act would normal-
ly be attributed to him by those who witnessed the proceedings. Of course, everyone 
present would unhesitatingly take it that he had undertaken to marry the woman. But 
then they would have equally unhesitatingly taken it that he had intended to marry her. 
No one not privy to his secret intentions would have had the slightest doubt on either of 
these points until his later protestations. Since the confidence about what he is doing 
goes hand in hand with a confidence about his intentions we can’t infer that the former 
is independent of the latter. Thus we can’t infer that the spectators suppose him to have 
been undertaking to marry the bride, whatever his intentions (Alston 2000: 140). 
Alston is correct here in noticing that there is some kind of non contingent relation 
between the effective occurrence of the illocutionary act and the attribution of illo-
cutionary intentions to the speaker by the part of the audience. The utterance counts 
as an illocutionary act for the audience because the audience believes that, in per-
forming that utterance in that context, the act is an expression of some quite specif-
ic intentions. If x counts as y in C, it is because, for that audience, x legitimately 
counts as an expression of the intention to y. It is here where the first and the sec-
ond person perspectives can tell apart. The first person perspective is the one of the 
speaker; from his point of view, under normal conditions, he knows whether he had 
the intention to R or not. The second person perspective is the one of the audience, 
who is aware of the occurrence of utterance x in context C, and correctly assumes 
that x in C counts as y. In doing so, they attribute to H the intention to make x 
count as y. This is perfectly correct. What I would claim here is that the key to 
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know whether the act took place or not is in this second person perspective—the 
one of hearers—not in the first person perspective—the one of the speaker. If the 
inferential basis for the audience is strong enough, that is, if it correctly justifies the 
attribution of the intention—something that could happen even if that attribution 
were wrong—the act actually happened—that is, Gazdar’s function would apply, 
and the normative context would have effectively changed. In this respect, the first 
person perspective is not determinant to know if the act took place or not—
although it might be determinant to know if it was an intentional act or not.  
Alston would disagree on this point. In his view, somebody “privy to his secret 
intentions” would have to assume that the speech act did not take place at all—e.g., 
because the groom thought that he had taken time off. But I would reply that even 
somebody privy to those hidden mental states would have to accept that the broom 
was getting married, even if he was not aware of that fact. The reason is that the 
performance of the act—the ‘outer’ utterance—was done in such a way that it was 
correct for the audience to assume it as an illocutionary act, precisely because they 
had no clue at all about the speaker’s deviant intentions. It is true that the hearers’ 
perspective was epistemically limited—i.e. they didn’t know about the secret inten-
tions of the speaker—; however, it is from this epistemically limited perspective 
where illocutionary adscriptions must always be made. The key to know if the act 
effectively took place is not to be found in that “privy” realm of the mind of the 
speaker, but in the public realm of social interaction. The performance of an illocu-
tionary acts is not constitutively connected to the private and secret intentions of 
the speaker—as a set of states that we could only hypothetically infer from his be-
haviour—but to the set of criteria that are, and must be, shared by the users of lan-
guage.  
Those socially established criteria—an idea taken from Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy (see Navarro-Reyes 2010)—are logically good reasons for the attribu-
tion of intentions. By acting in a certain way—e.g., by uttering some particular 
words in a specific context—you give your audience a good reason to believe that 
you had some intention in performing those actions. And that reason is somehow 
good ‘by definition’: acting in such a way means that you have such and such in-
tentions. However, even if their validity is a priori, criteria are defeasible. They are 
not infallible, and there might be an important ambiguity in their application; in 
those cases, we would probably give the speaker the benefit of the doubt about her 
own intentions. But if criteria are fulfilled up to a certain point, as they are in the 
situation Alston finally conceives, then the story leaves no room for ambiguity, and 
whatever the speaker later says about his own private states, his claims would just 
be out of order.  
This is what happens in the final version of the story: an extremely odd and 
twisted case, after all the qualifications that Alston imposes on it—excluding tranc-
es or dazzling situations, time off taken by the groom, and so on. We are asked to 
envisage a person who realizes that, in his situation, if he utters 'I do' without any 
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indication of a nonstandard use, he will be taken to have undertaken to marry the 
prospective bride. Realizing this, he says 'I do' without giving any indication of a 
nonstandard use, even though his intention is not to make the marital promise: 
I find this incoherent as a description of a person in possession of his senses. I can make 
no sense of the idea that a person in full possession of his faculties, realizing that utter-
ing S will place him in a certain position, proceeds to utter S in full awareness of what 
he is doing but without intending to place himself in that position. I would say that such 
a person has intentionally entered into the contract, whatever he may say later. With the 
constraints specified I don't know how to give a coherent description of the case except 
in those terms. […] [This] is rather like jumping out of a seventieth-story window in full 
knowledge of what that means, but not be intending to kill oneself (Alston 2000: 141). 
I think that what is perplexing for Alston is not that the imagined groom is irration-
al or inconsistent, but that the story itself is perfectly coherent with his own ac-
count. If the performance of the illocutionary act is strictly dependent on the causal 
role accomplished by the mental state of the speaker—his “privy” intention—, and 
this mental state is determined independently of any social criteria, his imagined 
Groom is perfectly conceivable: a person who would act according to social criteria 
up to point that would leave no doubts whatsoever about his own intentions... but 
would not have those intentions at all. What is odd in Alston’s final case is that the 
groom has simply no public excuse of any kind but, in Alston’s account, this situa-
tion does not prevent him from having the final and crucial excuse: that he simply 
did not intend to R, and he thus did not perform the illocutionary act at all.  
The possibility of an unintended groom is an effect of Alston’s reliance on pri-
vate intentions, as a constitutive feature of illocutionary acts. And the way he tries 
to escape from this undesired consequence of this account is extremely disconcert-
ing: 
(2) We must also not identify the question of what illocutionary act, if any, he per-
formed with the question of what conventional effect was generated. It is conceivable 
that the law should be such that when certain words are uttered (in the absence of certain 
kinds of defeaters such as coercion or mental incapacity) the utterer has taken on certain 
obligations and this consequence might hold regardless of what is the correct illocution-
ary description of his activity (Alston 2000: 139). 
By telling illocutionary acts apart from their conventional consequences, Alston 
assumes a cost that is much higher than he is willing to accept. Gazdar’s initial de-
scription of what a speech act is, for instance, would not work, since it could be the 
case that we had the function from one normative context to another just with the 
utterance. If Alston were right, we would be forced to say something like that the 
broom is married, even if he never got married; or that the promise was made, even 
if the speaker did not make any promise; or that the full English breakfast was or-
dered, even if nobody ordered it. What we find here is the phantom that haunted 
Austin: a view in which the performance of the speech act would take place in the 
hidden and private space of the soul of the utterer, where the words he uttered ex-
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ternally would be nothing but fallible and contingent symptoms of a sort of spiritu-
al, inner event. Alston’s imagined broom is finally no one else but Hippolytus. 
Once he has rejected those cases of unintentional speech acts as marginal, un-
important, and probably even contradictory, Alston considers the possibility of 
transforming his own account in such a way that even those cases would have their 
place: 
But if we do recognize unintentional illocutionary acts, how could they be treated in my 
theory? [...] 
We can define a variant of ‘R’; call it ‘R-U’ (‘U’ for ‘unintentional’). If R’ing that 
p is deliberately putting oneself in such a position that one is subject to correction in 
case of not-p, then R-U’ing that p is being in such a position by virtue of one's utterance, 
though not by deliberately putting oneself in that position. By substituting ‘R-U’ for ‘R’ 
throughout we can transform any analysis of an illocutionary act concept into an analy-
sis of a concept that applies indifferently to intentional and unintentional performances. 
The concept of being in the relevant normative position by virtue of uttering S will be 
the concept of, for example, promising to do D, whether intentionally or unintentional-
ly.[...] 
I could rewrite all the analysis schemata in this form, and if I felt that unintentional 
illocutionary acts were of sufficient importance I would do so. But since they are at 
worst nonexistent and at best of marginal importance, I do not choose to proceed in this 
way (Alston 2000: 141-2). 
The problem with this last twist in the argument is that changing R for R-U in the 
whole analysis would not just be a modification of the original version, but a sim-
ple rejection of it, since the change would affect Alston’s original definition of illo-
cutionary act. He had said that an illocutionary act essentially is a sort of intentional 
act—not a matter of the utterer's recognizing an already existing state of affairs, or 
assuming it—whereas at the end we would have the possibility of a genuine speech 
act, with legitimate normative implications, that is not intentional at all. This step 
would not just introduce a minor change in the theory, as Alston seems to believe. 
On the contrary, the whole house of cards was standing on this single claim: that 
the illocutionary act is what it is because the speaker intends it to be so.  
Alston refusal to introduce this final change in his analysis is explained by his 
disdain for those marginal cases—unintentional illocutionary acts—whose unim-
portance would not make it sensible to alter the whole system. But it is not laziness 
what prevents Alston from taking that step: it is architectural prudence. If we took 
this last idea seriously, we would have to tell the speaker’s intention to R apart 
from the correct illocutionary description of his action; and, as we saw before, we 
would also have to tell the correct illocutionary description of the action apart from 
the social normative effects that it would have. In other words: we would have to 
assume the whole collapse of Alston’s theory.  
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Conclusion: the second person perspective 
With this long discussion of Alston’s views I have tried to argue in favour of two 
thesis that are opposed to the ones that he defends: 
a) The discussion about unheard speech acts showed us that illocutionary ef-
fects—and thus the very performance of the illocutionary act—is constitu-
tively dependent on the audience’s uptake. An unheard speech act would not 
be a kind of speech act—since those utterances would not produce any 
change in the normative context. 
b) The discussion about unintended speech acts proved that what makes the ut-
terance count as a speech act is the legitimate attribution of intentions to the 
speaker by the part of her hearers. This legitimacy could fail, since it has to 
be done from a perspective which is always epistemically limited—the one 
of the audience. That makes it is perfectly possible to conceive unintended 
speech acts as a legitimate cases of speech acts—i.e., as effective changes in 
the normative context. From this point of view, unintended speech acts 
would be a legitimate category within speech acts tout court. 
In other words: by claiming that a speech act was unheard we would imply that it 
never took place as a speech act; whereas by claiming that a speech act was unin-
tentional we would be qualifying the kind of speech act that did effectively take 
place. 
I agree with Alston on the idea that there is no way to understand the working 
of speech acts without taking the idea of responsibility as a key point. But what is 
needed is not Alston’s conception of R’ing, as the intentional act by which the 
speaker makes herself responsible for her words. I would say that responsibility 
shows up later: with the uptake. I am not responsible for what I meant, or for what I 
intended to do with my words, but for what actually I did, and for the set of legiti-
mate expectations that my words produced in those who received them. What I 
have to answer for are my words, not my privy intentions.  
I have not been trying to prove that illocutionary intentions are superfluous in 
an account of speech acts. On the contrary: the legitimacy of the hearer’s detection 
of speech acts performance rely on criteria that are about these intentions. If we 
took intentions simply out of the story we would be throwing the baby away, to-
gether with the bath water. It is crucial for our illocutionary practices that utteranc-
es fulfil criteria for the attribution intentional states, and if they did not, then the 
practice would loose its meaning. But what is true for the practice does not have to 
be true for each and every performance within that practice. It is true that promises 
cannot be defined as a type of speech act unless we take into account what the 
normal intentions of promisors are. But the definition of a token promise, that is, 
our understanding of what the very occurrence of each and every promise is, cannot 
depend on the existence of those intentions in the privy realms of promisors, since 
otherwise we would be blind in the adscription of illocutionary acts to others.  
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It finally results that the only way to force Hippolytus to keep his word is by 
appealing to his words themselves, not to his privy intentions, or to his putative as-
sumption of responsibility for them. Illocutionary acts do not hold up because we 
make ourselves responsible for what we do while we are doing it, but because oth-
ers make us responsible for what we have done, once we have done it. The authori-
ty to say if an act was intentional or not might be found in the first person perspec-
tive; but the authority to say if the act itself took place—whether intentionally or 
not—must rely somewhere else: in the perspective of the second person, precisely 
because it is epistemically limited. 
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